Showing 3 results for Fallahi
Teimour Rahmani, Saman Fallahi, Mohammadghasem Rezaee, Mahboubeh Sabzrou,
Volume 19, Issue 11 (12-2011)
Abstract
In public sector economics, government intervention in the economy is generally justified on the existence of market failure. Government intervention means providing public goods. Financing public goods means taxation. Based on the theory of public choice in which citizens take part in elections to vote on the amount of public goods and taxes, we develop a model that analyzes the effect of democracy and corruption on the desire of taxpayers to pay taxes via the information that they convey about the quantity and quality of public goods in the utility function. Our theoretical analysis contends that desire to pay taxes is lower when corruption is higher or democracy is lower. Furthermore, it contends that the effect of corruption is stronger. Our empirical findings, based on a panel data analysis for 117 countries on the time period 1996-2010, support our theoretical analysis. Especially, we find that corruption is more important in the public desire to pay taxes.
Teimour Rahmani , Akbar Komijani , Saman Fallahi,
Volume 20, Issue 13 (6-2012)
Abstract
Corruption affects government finance and inflation tax level in different ways. According to the Optimal Government Finance Theory (Phelps, 1973 Helpman and Sadka, 1979), government as a rational agent uses different revenue sources to the extent that the total distortion effect of its financing is minimized. To achieve this, the marginal cost of inflation tax should be equal to the marginal cost of direct and indirect taxes. We expect that for an economy with high levels of corruption, ceteris paribus, the marginal cost of direct and indirect taxes is relatively high compared to the marginal cost of the inflation tax. A sample of 110 countries has been used to extract the empirical results. The main results have been obtained through using the Control of Corruption Index (CCI) for the period 1996- 2009. The empirical findings support our hypothesis. A higher level of corruption results in higher inflation tax. In order to check the robustness of our results, the main hypothesis has been examined by using Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for the period 2001- 2009. The results are the same. Moreover, the findings show that the effect of corruption on inflation tax is greater in developing countries.
Abdi Mohammadreza , Rahmani Teymur, Fallahi Saman,
Volume 20, Issue 14 (9-2012)
Abstract
The experience of large budget deficit in either developed or developing countries during the past decades have gradually led to the importance of assessing the fiscal stability and sustainability in economic literature. The fiscal stability lead to the feasibility of expenditure on public goods needed for economic infrastructures that provide long-run economic growth. In contrast, the fiscal instability of government results in variability in the necessary public expenditure that weakens long-run growth. In that case, notice to effective factors in government’s fiscal stability is necessary. Since the adaptation of VAT is one of the most remarkable events in the evolution of tax system in the past decade, in this study the effect of VAT share in total government revenue on fiscal stability will be examined. The volatility of budget deficit is used as an indicator for fiscal instability of government. The sample in this study includes 108 countries during the period 1990 to 2010. The empirical evidences obtained through a static and dynamic panel data analysis imply that the increase in share of VAT in total government revenue cause reduction in the volatility of budget deficit.