Volume 18, Issue 9 (2011)
J Tax Res 2011, 18(9): 9-24 |
Back to browse issues page
Download citation:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:
Navidi H, Tayyebnia A, Eskandari Z. Ex- officio Assessment Mechanism in an Ideal Tax System. J Tax Res 2011; 18 (9) :9-24
URL: http://taxjournal.ir/article-1-113-en.html
URL: http://taxjournal.ir/article-1-113-en.html
1- Faculty Member of Applied Mathematics and Computer Department at Shahed University
2- Faculty Member of Economics Department at Tehran University
3- Master of Science at Shahed University
2- Faculty Member of Economics Department at Tehran University
3- Master of Science at Shahed University
Abstract: (7947 Views)
Tax evasion, collusion and tax avoidance both result in non-realization of the estimated state tax revenue, so developing diverse strategies for preventing these phenomena is the most important tax policies in different countries. One of the states‘ preventive solutions is to encourage and punish taxpayers in different ways. Imposing different penalties for non-compliant taxpayers is the most effective methods and setting effective tax ratio results in increasing tax revenue.By focusing on symmetric tax rate (gross income in an ex–officio and ideal system), this paper aims at preventing tax evasion, calculates the final state revenue gained from a given taxpayer.
Type of Study: Research |
Received: 2014/03/11 | Accepted: 2014/03/11 | Published: 2014/03/11
Received: 2014/03/11 | Accepted: 2014/03/11 | Published: 2014/03/11
| Rights and permissions | |
 |
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. |
