Volume 18, Issue 9 (2011)                   J Tax Res 2011, 18(9): 9-24 | Back to browse issues page

XML Persian Abstract Print


Download citation:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:

Navidi H, Tayyebnia A, Eskandari Z. Ex- officio Assessment Mechanism in an Ideal Tax System. J Tax Res. 2011; 18 (9) :9-24
URL: http://taxjournal.ir/article-1-113-en.html
1- Faculty Member of Applied Mathematics and Computer Department at Shahed University
2- Faculty Member of Economics Department at Tehran University
3- Master of Science at Shahed University
Abstract:   (7228 Views)
Tax evasion, collusion and tax avoidance both result in non-realization of the estimated state tax revenue, so developing diverse strategies for preventing these phenomena is the most important tax policies in different countries. One of the states‘ preventive solutions is to encourage and punish taxpayers in different ways. Imposing different penalties for non-compliant taxpayers is the most effective methods and setting effective tax ratio results in increasing tax revenue.By focusing on symmetric tax rate (gross income in an ex–officio and ideal system), this paper aims at preventing tax evasion, calculates the final state revenue gained from a given taxpayer.
     
Type of Study: Research |
Received: 2014/03/11 | Accepted: 2014/03/11 | Published: 2014/03/11

Add your comments about this article : Your username or Email:
CAPTCHA

Rights and permissions
Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

© 2022 CC BY-NC 4.0 | Journal of Tax Research

Designed & Developed by : Yektaweb