[Home ] [Archive]   [ فارسی ]  
:: Main :: About :: Current Issue :: Archive :: Search :: Submit :: Contact ::
:: year 24, Issue 31 (12-2016) ::
tax research 2016, 24(31): 59-77 Back to browse issues page
Controlling Tax Evasion without Audit using Game Theory
Abstract:   (1277 Views)

In this paper, we introduce a new solution to tax evasion problem using game theory. Most of the papers investigating tax evasion model the game between government and taxpayer and calculate the probability of audit and evasion. However, the game played in this paper has changed the structure of game between government and taxpayers and models a game between taxpayers. In fact, government is not a player here and just imposes some rules that affect the outcomes of the game. The results show that in equilibrium, government manages to take the logical tax without audit and so taking cost.

Keywords: Tax Evasion, Audit Cost, Logical Tax, Game Theory
Full-Text [PDF 284 kb]   (1385 Downloads)    
Type of Study: Research | Subject: Economic
Received: 2017/04/19 | Accepted: 2017/04/19 | Published: 2017/04/19
Add your comments about this article
Your username or Email:

CAPTCHA code


XML   Persian Abstract   Print


Download citation:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:

Controlling Tax Evasion without Audit using Game Theory . tax research. 2016; 24 (31)
URL: http://taxjournal.ir/article-1-981-en.html


year 24, Issue 31 (12-2016) Back to browse issues page
فصلنامه پژوهشنامه مالیات (علمی-پژوهشی) Iranian National Tax Administration (INTA)
Persian site map - English site map - Created in 0.08 seconds with 31 queries by YEKTAWEB 3742