Journal of Tax Research

Abstract

Monitoring by regulatory bodies on the performance of tax officers can lead to prudent procedures by tax officers in tax identification and this could result in repeated referrals of tax cases to tax dispute resolution bodies, prolonged tax certainty, taxpayers' dissatisfaction, and failure to timely collect government tax revenue. Therefore, the purpose of the present study is to identify the factors that increase the diagnostic tax due to the monitoring by regulatory bodies on the performance of tax officers. Data collection tool was a questionnaire consisting of 20 questions whose content validity was confirmed by advisors and experts and its reliability was confirmed by Cronbach's Alpha method. The sample of the study was composed of 261 Tax officers of the general tax affairs departments of the provinces of Iran. To test the research hypotheses, T-test of a community was used. The results show that due to ambiguity in the tax laws, lack of transparency of the circulars and guidelines, lack of comprehensive bank of economic activities, time limit for issuance of diagnostic leaflet and insufficient expertise of tax officers, monitoring by regulatory bodies on the performance of tax officers increases the diagnostic tax. Previous research in the field of taxation has mainly examined the difference between the expressed revenue and diagnostic and definitive revenue. But the present study, while taking advantage of previous research findings, to identify the factors that given the oversight of regulatory bodies over the performance of tax officers, they have raised the diagnostic tax and created this discrepancy.

Introduction

In developed countries, taxation plays a central role in the economy, but in developing countries, the tax system is often inefficient and requires fundamental reform. Global experience shows that moving towards a system of "tax self-assessment" by taxpayers increases the efficiency of the tax system. Close tax supervision also helps reduce tax evasion and contribute to economic transparency. However, sometimes weak laws, lack of information, or expert limitations lead to over-assessment of taxes, which results in increased disputes, prolonged proceedings, and taxpayer dissatisfaction. However, previous research has rarely examined in detail the supervisory mechanisms that affect the increase in assessment taxes. This research seeks to identify solutions through which supervision by supervisory institutions can lead to an increase in assessment taxes.

Research Question is: Through what mechanisms does oversight by regulatory agencies lead to increased discretionary taxes?

Methods and Material         

The data collection tool is a questionnaire consisting of 20 closed questions, the content validity of which has been confirmed by professors and experts, and its reliability by Cronbach's Alpha method. The selected sample of the research was 261 tax officers of the National Tax Affairs Organization and the General Tax Affairs Offices at the provincial level. A population T-test was also used to examine the research hypotheses.

Results and Discussion

The findings of this study show that in the Iranian economic environment with its complex tax laws, frequent economic fluctuations, and weak information infrastructure, supervision by regulatory agencies can lead to defensive behavior of tax officials rather than increasing efficiency. In particular, ambiguity in laws and lack of transparency of circulars lead officials to adopt conservative approaches. This issue is exacerbated when the Iranian economy is facing sanctions and structural instability, as tax officials prefer to assess higher taxes to avoid potential regulatory consequences. Also, the lack of a comprehensive database and time constraints affect tax decisions and lead to an increase in the difference between declared and assessed taxes.

Conclusion

The present study, while utilizing the achievements of previous research on the factors that create the difference between declared and assessed income, has examined how this difference is created and identified the factors that, with respect to the supervision of supervisory institutions over the performance of tax officers, have caused the increase in assessed tax and created this difference. The findings of the study indicate that in the event of ambiguity in tax laws, lack of transparency of circulars and instructions, lack of a comprehensive database of taxpayers' economic activities, time limits on tax assessment, and lack of sufficient expertise and experience of tax assessment officers, supervision and control by supervisory institutions over the performance of tax officers will cause an increase in assessed tax and cause the process of tax certainty to be prolonged and the government's tax revenues to not be collected on time.