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J Tax Res 2025, 0 - : 155-190 |
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Barzegari M, Rostami E. Modeling the Optimal Use of Tax Late Payment Penalty Enforcement Guarantee to Prevent Tax Evasion and Avoidance. J Tax Res 2025; https://doi.org/10.61882/taxjournal.0.155
URL: http://taxjournal.ir/article-1-2538-en.html
URL: http://taxjournal.ir/article-1-2538-en.html
1- Tax Affairs Organization
2- Tax Affairs Organization ,rostamiehsan@mai.ir
2- Tax Affairs Organization ,
Abstract: (276 Views)
In the current economic situation of the country, designing an optimal tax system to prevent the tax gap is essential. Furthermore, currently, due to the lack of integration of taxpayers' income sources and the consequent failure to complete and aggregate all taxpayer information in accordance with Article 169 bis of the Direct Taxes Law, the groundwork exists for concealing income and, overall, tax evasion within the tax system. The objective of the present research is to model both dimensions of the tax gap between taxpayers and the National Tax Administration based on game theory. In the dimension of tax evasion, the strategies of the taxpayer versus the National Tax Administration are: declaring tax or concealing it. In contrast, the strategies of the National Tax Administration include either accepting or auditing the taxpayer. On the other hand, in the dimension of tax avoidance, the National Tax Administration seeks ways to collect its target tax from its taxpayers with the least cost and at the very initial stage of tax assessment and notification. Conversely, taxpayers seek to defer their tax payment as much as possible and maximize the use of market considerations.
Type of Study: Research |
Subject:
Economic
Received: 2025/08/25 | Accepted: 2025/09/1 | Published: 2025/09/1
Received: 2025/08/25 | Accepted: 2025/09/1 | Published: 2025/09/1
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